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Comment
Perspectives on Discharge or
Cancellation of Partnership
Indebtedness: Stackhouse
Revisited and Related
Conceptual Problems
L INTRODUCTION
When indebtedness of a partnership is discharged or cancelled,
difficult conceptual and mechanical problems arise under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954. This is due to an inadequately de-
fined interrelationship between the income tax provisions of
Subchapter K regarding partnerships and the general income
rules of Subchapter B regarding discharge of indebtedness.'
These problems are further accentuated by the wavering federal
income tax conception of a partnership as an entity for some pur-
poses and as a mere aggregation of individuals for other purposes.2
A variety of factual circumstances may give rise to these
problems, including the discharge of a partnership in bankruptcy,
the cancellation of partnership indebtedness by a third party cred-
itor, and the satisfaction of partnership obligations by payment at
less than face value. Although these types of transactions appear
to grant relief to partnerships and partners in general, unantici-
1. Subchapter K of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code was a response to the "con-
fusion" then existing in the tax treatment of partners and partnerships,
which was reflected in "inadequate" statutory provisions and "incomplete
and frequently contradictory" regulations, rulings, and court decisions for
which Congress undertook "the first comprehensive statutory treatment of
partners and partnerships in the history of the income tax laws." HR. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017,4091; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4721-22, quoted in Stackhouse v. United
States, 441 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1971). The extent to which the comprehen-
sive 1954 enactment has achieved the intended result of providing certainty
in the statutory treatment of partners and partnerships is debatable.
2. See generally United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); notes 36-42 & accom-
panying text infra.
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pated adverse tax consequences may befall partners in these cir-
cumstances. Although the statutory structure, judicial decisions,
and established Internal Revenue Service position clearly fail to
adequately define the tax consequences of these transactions, cer-
tain established positions appear to be nonetheless available to
lend a degree of certainty to the area. However, any attempt to
impose general discharge of indebtedness income notions into the
partnership income tax context is fraught with pitfalls.
This comment will develop the present state of the law, analyze
the prevailing conceptual problems, and attempt to shed a small
glimmer of light upon unresolved areas concerning the interrela-
tionship of the partnership income tax provisions of Subchapter K
and the general rules regarding discharge of indebtedness in-
come.
3
11. THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE
To provide a framework for analysis of the statutory and con-
ceptual problems involved, it is necessary to outline the partner-
ship income tax scheme of Subchapter K in some detail and
contrast it to the general rules regarding discharge of indebtedness
income of Subchapter B.
A. Subchapter K: The Section 752(b)-Section 731(a) Gain Recognition
Scheme
In Subchapter K, section 7524 governs the treatment of liabili-
ties generated upon formation, operation, or dissolution of a part-
nership. The primary significance of the treatment afforded
partnership liabilities lies in their inclusion in a partner's basis in
his or her partnership interest when a taxable event occurs.5
The bedrock provision for determining a partner's basis in his
or her partnership interest is section 705,6 which provides that in
3. For further development of the issues discussed in this comment, see gener-
ally W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R WHTMORE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNER-
sHIps AND PARTNERS (1977) [hereinafter cited as McKEE]; A. WILLIs,
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WILMS].
4. LIRC. § 752.
5. '"Taxable event" is used in the sense of an event which may give rise to the
realization and recognition of income or loss to a taxpayer. With regard to
partner-taxpayers, a taxable event occurs upon the sale or exchange of a part-
nership interest, LR.C. § 741, or upon certain distributions from a partnership
to a partner, I.R.C. § 731.
6. Under IR.C. § 705 determination of the adjusted basis of a partnership inter-
est is essentially a three-level process. The terms of the statute provide the
first two steps: (1) the determination of an initial basis for the interest de-
pending upon whether the interest was acquired by transfer or contribution,
and (2) the application of certain positive and negative adjustments to the
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determining basis on any given date, the partner's allocable share
of partnership liabilities on that date shall be included as part of
the basis of the partnership interest.7 The allocable share of part-
nership liabilities which is to be included in the basis of the part-
nership interest depends mainly upon two factors: the nature of
the partnership interest and the kind of liability involved. Partner-
ship liabilities may be either recourse or nonrecourse. Typically,
only general partners, to whom the loans are recourse, share in
recourse partnership liabilities on the basis of their relative loss-
sharing ratios. However, both general partners and limited part-
ners share in nonrecourse partnership liabilities on the basis of
their relative profit-sharing ratios.8 Therefore, inclusion of a part-
ner's allocable share of partnership liabilities in the partner's basis
in his or her partnership interest under section 705 causes a part-
ner's basis to fluctuate constantly with the level of partnership lia-
bilities.9 Consequently, when the level of partnership liability is
initial basis, depending upon and reflecting changes in the "net worth" of the
partnership itself. The statute provides:
(a) GENERAL RULF-The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in
a partnership shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be the
basis of such interest determined under section 722 (relating to
contributions to a partnership) or section 742 (relating to trans-
fers of partnership interests)-
(1) increased by the sum of his distributive share for the taxa-
ble year and prior taxable years of-
(A) taxable income of the partnership as determined
under section 703(a),
(B) income of the partnership exempt from tax under
this title, and
(C) the excess of the deductions for depletion over the
basis of the property subject to depletion;
(2) decreased (but not below zero) by distributions by the
partnership as provided in section 733 and by the sum of
his distributive share for the taxable year and prior taxa-
ble years of-
(A) losses of the partnership, and
(B) expenditures of the partnership not deductible in
computing its taxable income and not properly
chargeable to capital account, and
(3) decreased (but not below zero), by the amount of the
partner's deduction for depletion under section 611 with
respect to oil and gas wells.
LR.C. § 705(a). The third step, established by regulation, provides that as of
any given date the basis also includes the partner's allocable share of part-
nership liabilities as determined under I.R.C. § 752. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
1(e) (1956).
7. See Treas. Reg. § 1.705-1(a) (4) (1956).
8. Id. § 1.752-1(e).
9. However, this constant fluctuation is of no consequence to the individual
partners. The relationship of partnership liabilities to the adjusted basis of
an interest in a partnership, as provided by I.R.C. §§ 705 and 752, is only
significant when a taxable event occurs. See note 5 supra.
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reduced by discharge or cancellation, the basis of the partnership
interest under section 705 will be reduced by the partner's alloca-
ble share of the liability reduction, regardless of whatever collat-
eral tax consequences arise from the transaction. 10
When partnership debt is discharged, the key provision is sec-
tion 752(b), which provides that any decrease in a partner's share
of the liabilities of the partnership or any decrease in a partner's
individual liabilities by reason of their assumption by the partner-
ship shall be considered a distribution of money to the partner by
the partnership." When a section 752(b) "deemed"' 2 distribution
occurs, section 733 is invoked. Section 733 provides that in the case
of a distribution by a partnership to a partner other than in liquida-
tion of a partner's interest, the adjusted basis of the partner's in-
terest in the partnership shall be reduced (but not below zero) by
the amount of any money distributed to the partner.13 Any further
tax impact of a section 752 (b) deemed distribution, beyond the sec-
tion 733 basis reduction, is controlled by section 731(a), which pro-
vides that in the case of a distribution by a partnership to a
partner, gain shall not be recognized to the partner, except to the
extent that any money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of
his or her partnership interest immediately before the distribu-
tion.14 Any gain recognized by the distributee partner under sec-
tion 731(a) is treated as gain from the sale or exchange of his or
her partnership interest,15 and, therefore, is subject to section 741.
That section provides that the gain shall be treated as gain from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise pro-
vided in section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inven-
tory items which have appreciated substantially in value).' 6
10. This interlocking of the basis of a partnership interest with the share of part-
nership liabilities allocable thereto inevitably results in a discharge of part-
nership indebtedness reducing the partners' bases in their partnership
interests under I.RC. § 705. LR.C. §§ 752(b), 733, and 705(a) (2) appear to rec-
ognize and provide for this inevitable result.
11. LR.C. § 752(b). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1956). On the other hand,
LPC. § 751(a) provides that any increase in a partner's share of partnership
liabilities or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the
partner assuming the partnership liabilities, shall be considered contribution
of money by the partner to the partnership. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (a)
(1956). Therefore, a "deemed" contribution of money by the partner to the
partnership results.
12. "Deemed" is used in the sense of a hypothetical or constructive distribution
by the partnership to the partner. This is also applicable to "deemed" contri-
butions under LR.C. § 752(a). See note 11 supra.
13. LIC. § 733.
14. Id. § 731 (a) (1).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 741. The hypothetical sale or exchange treatment afforded partnership
distributions under LR.C. § 731 generally results in capital gain recognition
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In summary, when partnership debt is reduced by discharge,
cancellation, or other means of satisfaction, Subchapter K pro-
vides a gain recognition scheme for the partner under sections
752(b) and 731(a) which operates independently from any other
income or gain recognition to the partnership itself which arises
from the transaction.17 Gain recognition to the distributee partner
occurs immediately only if the amount of the section 752(b)
deemed distribution exceeds the adjusted basis of the partner's in-
terest in the partnership immediately before the distribution.18
Because the partner's basis in his or her partnership interest
under section 705 includes the partner's allocable share of the lia-
bility discharged, the amount of the section 752(b) deemed distri-
bution would exceed the basis in the partnership interest only in
those circumstances in which the distributee partner has a nega-
tive basis in the partnership interest.19 However, if immediate
gain recognition results, the gain should be accorded capital gain
treatment under section 731(a).20 Whether immediate gain recog-
nition is required or not, to the extent the section 752(b) deemed
distribution reduces the basis of a partnership interest under sec-
unless LR.C. § 751 is applicable. I.R.C. § 751 will inject an ordinary income
element into the distribution to the extent the distribution relates to unreal-
ized receivables and substantially appreciated inventory items. Whether
LRC. § 751 could be construed to inject an ordinary income element into a
transaction in which partnership indebtedness is discharged, thereby result-
ing in a "deemed" distribution by the partnership to the partner, is as yet
unexplored and beyond the scope of this comment.
17. The best example of this propositon is set forth in McKzE, supra note 3, at 9-
36:
Consider, for example, a sale by a partnership of an asset with a
basis of $100 and a value of $200. The asset is subject to a $200 liabil-
ity, which is assumed by the purchaser as the sole consideration in
payment for the asset. Clearly, the partnership realizes $100 of gain
($200 consideration less $100 basis) under § 61(a) (3) and the general
sale-or-exchange rules of §§ 1001 and 1002. In addition, the partners
receive a $200 § 752(b) distribution as a result of the decrease in the
partnership's liabilities. The fact that the partners receive a § 752(b)
distribution does not preclude the partnership from realizing gain
under § 1001.
This underlying proposition is the central basis of this comment, namely, that
in partnership debt discharge transactions two independent elements are op-
erative: an ordinary discharge of indebtedness income element and a capital
gain distribution element. The only remaining problem is whether the ex-
isting statutory scheme will support such a proposition.
18. LR.C. § 731(a).
19. This would be the case only if a partner had a negative capital account and a
" positive" adjusted basis for the partnership interest as a result of including
his or her proportionate share of partnership liabilities in the basis. See Wi-
us, supra note 3, § 21.05. This generally would occur where partnership losses
or partner withdrawals of cash exceeded income generated by the partner-
ship or loans acquired by the partnership over a period of time.
20. See note 16 supra.
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tion 733, gain recognition has been deferred until final disposition
of the partnership interest by the distributee partner.
21
B. Subchapter B: The Section 61(a)(12) Income Recognition Scheme
In Subchapter B, section 61(a) (12) embodies the general princi-
ple established by United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,22 that-debtors
realize taxable income upon the cancellation or discharge of their
debts, by providing that the general definition of gross income in-
cludes income from discharge of indebtedness. 23 However, several
judicial exceptions to the Kirby Lumber doctrine have been devel-
oped to alleviate hardship to the debtor and generally modify the
section 61(a) (12) provision.24 Most notable is the insolvency excep-
tion under which debtors are deemed to realize no taxable income
from discharge of indebtedness if they are insolvent after the dis-
charge. Insolvent is defined in the bankruptcy sense, i.e., liabilities
exceed assets.25 However, if rendered solvent by the discharge,
debtors are deemed to realize taxable income to the extent of their
solvency.26 The principles underlying the insolvency exception
have been specifically embodied in the regulations promulgated
under section 61(a) (12).27 It should be noted that any income real-
ized under section 61(a) (12) is ordinary income. Therefore, to the
extent that a liability is discharged, a taxpayer may realize ordi-
nary income under section 61(a) (12), unless the insolvency excep-
tion principles are applicable, in which case part or all of the
section 61(a) (12) ordinary income may be shielded from income
tax.28
In recognition that debt discharge situations generally accom-
21. See Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465, 470 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). See generally Donald, Chirelstein & Suwalsky, Cancellation
of Indebtedness, 88-3rd TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-12 to -13 (1976).
23. LR.C. § 61(a) (12). The Kirby Lumber doctrine was predicated on the notion
that a debtor realizes an economic gain or increase in net worth as a result of
a discharge of indebtedness. This doctrine also finds income realization
when a taxpayer satisfies obligations at less than face value. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-12(a) (1957).
24. See MCKEE, supra note 3, at 9-34 n.121.
25. See Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95
(5th Cir. 1934); Astoria Marine Constr. Co., 12 T.C. 798 (1949); Madison Rys.
Co., 36 B.T.A. 1106 (1937).
26. See Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1941); Conestoga
Transp. Co., 17 T.C. 506 (1951) (acq.); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289
(1937).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (1963). See also Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 C.B. 29.
28. To the extent that income from discharge of indebtedness is limited by the
insolvency exception, tax avoidance is accomplished because no asset basis
adjustment is required to defer recognition of the amount excluded. See Don-
ald, Chirelstein & Suwalsky, supra note 22, at A-12.
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pany financially depressed taxpayers, a deferral mechanism for
section 61(a) (12) income has been provided. If a debtor realizes
taxable income from discharge of indebtedness under section
61(a) (12), recognition of that income may be deferred by applica-
tion of sections 108 and 1017.29 Under section 108, no discharge of
indebtedness income must be recognized by the taxpayer if two
conditions are met: (1) The indebtedness must have been incurred
or assumed by an individual in connection with property used in a
trade or business, 30 and (2) the taxpayer must make and file an
effective consent to adjustment of the basis of the property under
section 1017.31 The provision for an asset basis reduction in ex-
change for nonrecognition of ordinary discharge of indebtedness
income effectively defers gain recognition until the taxpayer ulti-
mately disposes of the asset.
In summary, when a debt is discharged or cancelled, ordinary
income may be realized by the debtor under section 61(a) (12).
However, through application of the insolvency exception or sec-
tion 108, recognition of that ordinary income may be avoided com-
pletely or deferred.32 Nonetheless, in discharge of indebtedness
transactions, taxpayers must deal with the possibility of ordinary
income recognition under section 61(a) (12).33
C. The Partnership Income Tax System--The Aggregate and Entity
Theories
Before any attempt is made to integrate section 61(a) (12) dis-
charge of indebtedness income principles and the partnership in-
29. LR.C. §§ 108, 1017.
30. Id. § 108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.108-(a) (1) (1956). The Service has apparently
conceded the issue of whether a partnership is an "individual" for purposes
of this section in Rev. Rul. 72-205, 1972-1 C.B. 37. As to whether a statutory
basis exists for this concession, see note 104 & accompanying text infra.
31. LR.C. § 108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.108-(a) (2) (1956). It should be noted that regu-
lations have been promulgated under I.R.C. § 1017 for rules regarding priori-
ties in the adjustment of the bases of different assets.
32. If the deferral provisions of sections 108 and 1017 are resorted to in situations
in which the insolvency exception also applies, the taxpayer receives two
types of tax benefits: deferral and avoidance. The amount of asset basis re-
duction called for by section 108 is cast in terms of the "amount excluded"
from gross income which would otherwise be recognized under section
61(a) (12). Therefore, the basis reduction does not include that amount ex-
cluded from section 61(a) (12) by reason of the insolvency exception. In a
situation in which both the insolvency exception and section 108 provide tax
relief, the amount of income excluded by the insolvency exception is com-
pletely shielded from taxation while recognition of the amount excluded by
section 108 is only temporarily deferred.
33. For problems related to discharge of indebtedness income recognition, see
generally Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax:
A Problem of Creeping Confision, 14 TAx. L. REV. 225 (1959).
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come tax system of Subchapter K, an outline of two competing
theories of partnership income taxation embodied in Subchapter
K (the entity theory and the aggregate theory) must be set forth.34
The entity and aggregate theories are of particular importance in
determining the appropriate statutory mechanism for bringing the
final tax impact of items of income realized by the partnership to
bear upon the individual partners. This is a separate and distinct
determination from any gain recognition arising from transactions
affecting partnership liabilities under the section 752(b)-section
731(a) scheme. 35 If a partnership may indeed realize section
61(a) (12) income from discharge of partnership indebtedness, the
proper statutory mechanism to handle this item of partnership in-
come must be determined under existing Subchapter K provi-
sions.
Probably the clearest articulation of the differing conceptions of
a partnership for various Subchapter K purposes was set forth in
United States v. Bayse,36 in which the Supreme Court com-
mented: "The legislative history indicates, and the commentators
agree, that partnerships are entities for purposes of calculating
and filing informational returns but they are conduits through
which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in
accord with their distributive shares. '37 Under the conduit or ag-
gregate theory,3 the partnership as a distinct entity is essentially
ignored. The partnership is treated as existing solely for the pur-
pose of collecting information to determine partnership income or
loss. This income or loss is then distributed to the partners who
include it in their taxable income and pay tax on it. Under the ag-
gregate theory, therefore, factors at the partner level which have
an impact on the partners' individual tax liability would be consid-
34. For a helpful discussion, see generally WILLIS, supra note 3, §§ 2.01-.04 Mc-
KEE, supra note 3, 1.02.
35. See note 17 supra.
36. 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
37. Id. at 448.
38. The bedrock aggregate concept provision of Subchapter K provides that "[a]
partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this
chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income
tax only in their separate and individual capacities." I.R.C. § 701. The aggre-
gate theory is further evidenced in the statutory mechanism for passing
through partnership items of income and loss to the partners. See notes 43-45
& accompanying text infra. LR.C. § 752, by including in a partner's basis in
his or her partnership interest a pro rata share of partnership liabilities, also
adopts an aggregate theory perspective and attempts to obtain in a partner-
ship situation the equivalence of a partner individually owning property sub-
ject to an encumbrance under the doctrine of Crane v. Commissiner, 331 U.S.
1 (1947).
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ered with regard to items of income or loss passed through by the
partnership.
On the other hand, under the entity theory,39 the partnership is
viewed as a distinct entity for federal income tax purposes, one
which separately holds assets and conducts activities in its own
right. Under an entity theory, factors at the partner level would
not be considered in relationship to the ultimate tax impact of
partnership items of income or loss passed through to the part-
ners.
This persistent aggregate/entity theoretical tension in Sub-
chapter K is manifest in the statutory mechanisms developed to
transfer the final tax impact of partnership transactions to the indi-
vidual partners. It has an important impact on the handling of sec-
tion 61(a) (12) discharge income in the partnership context, most
notably, on the application of the insolvency exception. Sections
70240 and 70341 set forth the system for handling partnership items
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit.42 On an aggregate the-
ory basis, section 702 (a) sets forth specified classes of partnership
items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit which the partners
,are to take into account separately in determining their distribu-
tive share43 to be included in their individual tax returns. How-
39. The impact of the entity theory on Subchapter K is more pronounced than
what is made apparent by the Bayse articulation. A partnership, as an entity
for federal tax purposes, may adopt its own taxable year (LR.C. § 706), engage
in arm's length transactions with a partner (LR.C. § 707(a)), make elections
for the partnership (I.R.C. § 703(b)), and have a basis for property contrib-
uted to it (I.R.C. § 723).
40. LR.C. § 702.
41. Id. § 703.
42. For an excellent discussion of the Bayse implications on this issue, see Pu-
sey, The Partnership as an "Entity's" Implications of Bayse, 54 TAxEs 143
(1976). As set out in this article, aggregate/entity issues have been addressed
by subsequent courts without mention of Bayse. See id. at 143 n.2.
43. As a general rule under LR.C. § 702(a), each partner, in determining his or
her income tax, shall take into account separately his or her distributive
share of the following partnership items:
1. gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for not
more than 1 year,
2. gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for
more than I year,
3. gains and losses from sales or exchanges of property described in sec-
tion 1231 (relating to certain property used in a trade or business and
involuntary conversions),
4. charitable contributions (as defined in section 170(c)),
5. dividends with respect to which there is provided an exclusion under
section 116, or a deduction under part VIJ of Subchapter B,
6. taxes, described in section 901, paid or accrued to foreign countries
and to possessions of the United States,
7. other items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, to the extent
provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, and
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ever, separate items classified under sections 702(a)(1)-(7) as
compared to section 702(a) (8) may have different consequences at
the partner level based upon an entity theory distinction. Items
separately stated under sections 702 (a) (1)-(7) are characterized at
the partnership level,44 with each partner taking into account sepa-
rately his or her distributive share of the item at the partner level.
This evidences an aggregate theory of taxation in which the ulti-
mate tax impact to the partner of items separately stated and
passed through may be affected by factors at the partner level. On
the other hand, an item separately stated as section 702 (a) (8) "tax-
able income or loss," though similarly characterized at the partner-
ship level,45 is divided into distributive shares at the partnership
level and subsequently passed through to the partners. This evi-
dences an entity theory of taxation, in which the ultimate tax im-
pact of the partnership item is unaffected by factors at the partner
level.
Therefore, in situations in which the insolvency exception is ap-
plicable, whether section 61(a) (12) partnership discharge income
is approached under an aggregate theory or an entity theory can
have a significant impact on the appropriate statutory mechanism.
If, under an aggregate theory, partnership discharge of indebted-
ness income were to be considered a section 702(a) (7) "other item
of income," the insolvency exception would be applicable at the
partner level with the post-discharge solvency of the partner serv-
ing as a limitation of his or her individual recognition of partner-
ship discharge income.4 However, if under an entity theory,
partnership discharge income were considered a section 702(a) (8)
item included in "taxable income or loss," the insolvency excep-
tion would be applicable at the partnership level without the post-
discharge solvency of the partner serving as an independent limi-.
tation of his or her recognition of partnership discharge of indebt-
8. taxable income or loss, exclusive of items requiring separate compu-
tation under other paragraphs of this subsection.
This is the basic statutory format through which the tax impact of partner-
ship activities is funneled through to the individual partners.
44. I-R.C. § 702(b) provides that the character of an item separately stated under
I.R.C. § 702(a) (1)-(7) is determined as if the item were realized directly from
the source from which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same
manner as incurred by the partnership. By determining the character of
items at the partnership level, their character is passed through intact to the
partners.
45. This distinction in treatment arises from the omission of IR.C. § 702(a) (8)
items from the character pass-through provision of LR.C. § 702(b) and the
LR.C. § 703(a) statement that the taxable income of the partnership shall be
computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual.
46. See notes 97-100 & accompanying text infra.
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edness income.47 If a partnership may realize section 61(a) (12)
discharge of indebtedness income, the statutory mechanism for
channeling the tax impact of that income to the partners, and in
some circumstances the ultimate tax impact, will differ depending
upon whether an aggregate or entity theory approach is adopted.
Ill THE STATUTORY AND CONCEPTUAL CONFLICT
The entity/aggregate conflict apparently underlies many of the
conceptual problems involved in adapting the partnership income
tax model of Subchapter K to differing forms of income realization.
One cannot escape the conceptual dilemma that a partnership as
an entity realizes income as a consequence of its transactions,48
yet is liable for the tax impact of that income realization only as an
aggregation of individual partners. 49 To the extent that the part-
nership entity and the aggregate partners of which it is composed
cannot be insulated from one another for federal income tax pur-
poses, the conceptual problem will remain.
Any attempt to reconcile the general rules regarding discharge
of indebtedness income and the partnership income tax scheme in
situations in which partnership debt is cancelled, discharged, or
satisfied by payment at less than face value will require analysis of
the following conceptual and statutory problems:5 0
1. Whether a solvent partnership realizes section 61(a) (12)
income when partnership debt is discharged, or whether
the tax consequences are governed solely by the gain rec-
ognition rules of sections 752(b) and 731(a). This involves
the underlying issue of whether the section 61(a) (12) in-
come recognition aspect and the section 752(b)-section
731(a) gain recognition aspect of a discharge transaction
are to be accorded independent significance.
2. Assuming section 61(a)(12) and section 752(b) are ac-
corded independent significance, whether the insolvency
exception is applicable and its manner of application.
3. Assuming section 61(a)(12) and section 752(b) are ac-
corded independent significance, whether the deferral pro-
visions of sections 108 and 1017 are applicable and their
manner of application.
The remainder of the comment will focus on the analysis of these
problems in light of the existing statutory structure, case law, and
established Service position.
47. See note 58 & accompanying text infra.
48. See LIC. § 703(a).
49. See id. § 701.
50. See generally McKEE, supra note 3, at 9-34; WmiLs, supra note 3, § 22.09.
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IV. BASIC POSITIONS-STACKHOUSE REVISITED
A. Stackhouse: Section 61(a)(12) Income Recognition v. Section
752(b)-Section 731(a) Gain Recognition
The interrelationship of sections 752(b) and 731(a) of Sub-
chapter K and the section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness in-
come rules was explored for the first time in Stackhouse v. United
States.5 1 In 1960, Vincent Stackhouse and Robert Williams formed
a successor partnership to a former partnership of which they had
been members. The new partnership took over the assets and lia-
bilities of the former partnership, including a liability to an unre-
lated third party for fees owed, based on a contract for loans in
exchange for a percentage of partnership profits. In 1963,
Stackhouse rescinded the contract and refused to pay the out-
standing indebtedness of $126,882. During ensuing litigation, the
debt was released and settled for $30,000, thereby discharging the
partnership from indebtedness in the amount of $96,882.52
Subsequently, a dispute between the partner-taxpayers and the
Internal Revenue Service arose over whether section 61(a) (12) or
sections 752(b) and 731(a) controlled the tax impact of a discharge
of partnership indebtedness owed to a third party. In particular,
the parties stipulated that immediately after and as a result of the
settlement, the net worth (solvency) of Williams was $41,583 and of
Stackhouse was $32,766, based upon an aggregate theory of sol-
vency as to the partners; and that the partnership itself had been
rendered solvent to the extent of $8,854.53
In the district court, the Service argued that section 61(a) (12)
solely controlled the tax impact of discharge of parntership indebt-
edness owed to a third party, and that each partner should be as-
sessed ordinary income to the extent of his personal solvency. On
51. 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g and remanding 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-414 (W.D.
Tex. 1970).
52. Id. at 466.
53. Id. The Commissioner approached the question of the solvency of the indi-
vidual partners on an aggregate theory basis. The Commissioner determined
that immediately after the settlement, the partnership was rendered solvent
to the extent of $8,854, on the basis that Williams had a positive capital ac-
count balance of $11,927, while Stackhouse had a negative account balance of
$3,073. William's interest in the partnership was valued at $11,927 while
Stackhouse's interest in the partnership was considered a debt owed to the
extent of $3,073. To these values were added each partner's interest in part-
nership goodwill and the value of each partner's individually owned property
to arrive at the net worth amounts. These values were stipulated by the par-
ties. See also Turney Estate v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1942);
Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.TA. 289 (1937). In determining the solvency of
the partnership under an aggregate theory approach, the value of each part-
ner's net worth as a contingent asset of the partnership was not taken into
account. See note 98 infra.
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the other hand, the partner-taxpayers argued that sections 752(b)
and 731(a) solely controlled the tax impact of the transaction.
Neither party advanced the position that both the section
61(a) (12) income and section 752(b) gain aspects of the discharge
transaction should be analyzed. The district court supported the
Service's position on the theory that there had been "no distribu-
tion"54 to invoke the sections 752(b) and 731(a) gain recognition
scheme. This theory clearly ignored the language and intended ef-
fect of section 752(b).
The final tax impact of upholding the Service's position should
be noted: The partnership realized section 61(a) (12) discharge of
indebtedness income in the amount of $96,882 (the difference be-
tween the amount of the liability and the amount of the settle-
ment) which would be divided equally ($48,441) between the
partners under the partnership agreement. Under an aggregate
theory approach, this section 61(a) (12) partnership discharge of
indebtedness income would be treated as a section 702(a) (7)
"other item of income" which each partner would take into account
separately for recognition as ordinary income. However, the Ser-
vice conceded that because the partnership had been insolvent
before the settlement, income to each partner should be recog-
nized only to the extent of his solvency immediately after the set-
tlement. Therefore Williams would only recognize ordinary
income of $41,583; Stackhouse, $32,765. 55 By applying the insol-
vency exception on an aggregate theory basis, the partner's post-
discharge solvency limited the recognition of the amount of section
61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income passed through to the
partners as a section 702(a) (7) item.
By applying the insolvency exception in the partnership con-
text to limit the amount of section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebted-
ness income that must be recognized by a partner, a potential
problem develops regarding the partner's basis in his other part-
nership interest under section 705.56 Under an aggregate theory
approach, the full amount of section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebt-
edness income is passed through to the partners as a section
702(a) (7) item, with the insolvency exception being applied at the
partner level to limit ultimate recognition. This assures that the
basis of a partnership interest would be increased by the full
amount of the allocable share of partnership discharge of indebt-
54. The court stated that "there was no distribution here of any partnership as-
sets to a partner, and there was no sale or exchange of partnership assets
with the resulting proceeds being distributed to the partners. There was sim-
ply a cancellation of a debt which section 61(a) (12) explicitly designates as
income." See 27 A.F.T.R.2d at 71-415.
55. 441 F.2d at 466-67.
56. See note 6 supra.
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edness income passed through, even though ultimate recognition
is limited 57 However, if the insolvency exception is applied under
an entity theory approach, so as to limit the amount of income
passed through to a partner under the section 702(a) scheme, the
amount of increase in the partner's basis in his or her partnership
interest would also be limited under section 705, unless the
amount of potential section 61(a)(12) discharge of indebtedness
income excluded by application of the insolvency exception could
be classified under section 705(a) (1) (B) as "income of the partner-
ship exempt from tax."5 8 This would provide for a full basis in-
crease under section 705 for the partner's total allocable share of
section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income realized by
the partnership. Therefore, the basis of the partnership interest is
potentially affected in insolvency exception situations, depending
on whether an aggregate or entity theory approach is taken.
Under the Service's essentially aggregate position, the partners
immediately recognize ordinary income from discharge of partner-
ship indebtedness. Since the insolvency exception issue is ap-
proached under an aggregate theory, each partner receives a full
basis increase in his or her partnership interest under section 705,
thereby avoiding the possible statutory problem if the issue were
approached under an entity theory. Also, to the extent that the ac-
companying increase in the partner's basis in his or her partner-
ship interest under section 705 creates an artifically high basis,5 9 a
built-in loss may be created which could only be recognized as a
capital loss on complete disposition by the partner of the partner-
ship interest.60
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the deci-
sion of the district court was reversed in favor of the taxpayers.6 1
In support of the district court decision, the Service again con-
57. See LR.C. § 705(a) (1) (A); note 6 supra. However, this approach is not with-
out its difficulties because, to the extent the insolvency exception applies, it
is arguable that the discharge did not produce "income" to be passed through
under LR.C. § 702(a) (7) as an "item of income." See MCKEE, supra note 3, at
9-38 n.138.
58. This approach is also not without its difficulties because it is arguable that to
the extent the insolvency exception applies, there is no "income" within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 705(a) (1) (B) "tax-exempt income" to provide the basis
increase. See McKEE, supra note 3, at 9-39.
59. The basis of the partnership is artifically high as a practical result of increas-
ing the basis of each partnership interest by the amount of ordinary income
realized by each partner on the cancellation of the indebtedness, and then, as
an inevitable result, reducing the basis of each partnership interest by the
amount of the liability cancelled. See Aronsohn, The Financially Troubled
Partnership, 34 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 327, 348 (1976).
60. See IR.C. §§ 741, 731 (a) (2).
61. 441 F.2d at 465.
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tended that section 61(a) (12) solely controls transactions in which
partnership indebtedness to a third party is discharged. The "no
distribution" rationale was arguably supported by a narrow statu-
tory interpretation of section 752(b) to the effect that the statute
deals solely with intra-partner rights and liabilities and does not
affect a partner-taxpayer's realization of gain from the discharge of
partnership indebtedness owed to a third party.62
To the contrary, the partner-taxpayers again argued that the
section 752(b)--Section 731(a) gain recognition scheme solely con-
trolled the tax impact of the transaction. Once again, neither party
argued that the section 61(a)(12) income and section
752(b)--Section 731(a) gain aspects of the partnership discharge
of indebtedness transaction should be analyzed. The court con-
cluded that although the statute could be narrowly construed as
applicable only to liabilities resulting from transactions among
partners or between individual partners and the parnership, a
broader interpretation was required in light of the legislative his-
tory and current Treasury Regulations promulgated under section
61(a) (12).63 Clearly, section 752(b) was intended to cover transac-
tions in which partnership indebtedness to a third party was dis-
charged.64 Therefore, since a section 752(b) deemed distribution
occurred on the settlement of the partnership liability, gain recog-
nition was to be determined under section 731(a). 65
The final tax impact of upholding the partner-taxpayer's posi-
62. Compare J.C. Nichols v. Commissioner, 42 B.TA. 618 (1940).
63. 441 F.2d at 468-69. The relevant legislative history provided that "when the
liabilities of the partnership are decreased, thereby decreasing each partner's
share of such liabilities, the amount of the decrease shall be treated as a pro
rata distribution by the partnership, thereby reducing the basis of each part-
ner's interest in the amount of his share of the increase." H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236-37, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4017,4376-77; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 4621, 5047. The relevant regulation provides:
Where the liabilities of a partnership are decreased, and each part-
ner's share of such liabilities is thereby decreased, the amount of the
decrease shall be treated as a distribution of money to the partner by
the partnership. For example partnership AB, in which A and B are
equal partners, repays an obligation of $10,000. The repayment
reduces each partner's share of partnership liabilities by $5,000 and is
considered a distribution of money which reduces the basis of each
partner's interest in the partnership by that amount. For the effect of
a discharge of partnership property, see sections 108 and 1017.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1) (1956).
64. The court explicitly stated that IU.C. § 752 applies "to those situations in
which the liabilities of the partnership itself are decreased, thereby decreas-
ing each partner's share of those liabilities.... [A] reduction of liabilities
would... occur if a partnership obligation were forgiven, or... discharged
for a lesser amount than the total due." 441 F.2d at 469.
65. See note 92 infra.
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tion in Stackhouse should be noted: A section 752(b) deemed dis-
tribution to each partner in the amount of $63,441 (one-half of the
total outstanding indebtedness) occurred on the settlement, re-
ducing each partner's basis in his partnership interest under sec-
tion 733. The section 752(b) deemed distribution exceeded the
stipulated adjusted basis 66 of the partnership interests as to
Stackhouse by $12,029, and as to Williams by $0.
Under the partner-taxpayer's position, only Stackhouse imme-
diately recognized capital gain as a result of the discharge of part-
nership indebtedness. 67 Also, to the extent the basis for each
partnership interest was reduced under section 733, capital gain
recognition was deferred until complete disposition of the partner-
ship interest.68
As a result of the Stackhouse decisions, the Service and part-
ner-taxpayer have basically adopted polar positions over whether
section 61(a) (12) or section 752(b)-section 731(a) are to solely
control the tax impact of transactions involving discharge of part-
nership indebtedness. Under the Service's position, in which the
tax impact is solely controlled by section 61(a) (12), the partner-
ship realizes ordinary income. The recognition may be limited by
the insolvency exception, calculated under an aggregate theory ap-
proach and applied at the partner level. Under the partner-taxpay-
ers' position, supported in Stackhouse, in which the tax impact is
solely controlled by sections 752(b) and 731(a), the partner-tax-
payers recognize capital gain only where the amount of liability
deemed distributed exceeds the adjusted bases of their partner-
ship interests.
Several aspects of the Stackhouse result should be noted. First,
if the tax impact of the transaction is controlled solely by sections
752(b) and 731(a), the section 61(a) (12) insolvency exception prin-
ciples Would appear inapplicable in the Subchapter K context.
Consequently, partner-taxpayers could conceivably be required to
recognize capital gain in an amount in excess of their net worth
(solvency), 69 a disadvantage not suffered by nonpartner-taxpay-
ers. Second, this position provides partner-taxpayers with two sig-
nificant advantages over nonpartner-taxpayers in the area of
66. See note 53 supra.
67. For any possible ordinary income consequence, see note 16 supra.
68. This deferral effect was recognized by the court. See 441 F.2d at 470 n.3. Com-
pare, Reduction in Partnership Liabilities, 37 J. TAx. 136 (1972).
69. The Stackhouse rationale may prove disadvantageous in situations in which
partners who are not rendered solvent by the cancellation will nonetheless
be required to recognize gain to the extent their share of the cancelled debt
exceeds their bases in the partnership. See Donald, Chirelstein & Suwalsky,
supra note 22, at A-13. However, this disadvantage to partner-taxpayers was
eliminated in Rev. Rul. 71-301, 1971-2 C.B. 257.
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discharge of business indebtedness. The primary advantage is the
ability to convert immediate ordinary income recognition into de-
ferred or limited-immediate capital gain recognition. Also, non-
partners must elect under section 108 to reduce the basis of
business property under section 1017 in order to avoid immediate
recognition of section 61(a) (12) ordinary income. Partners, on the
other hand, can effectively defer or limit immediate gain recogni-
tion under section 733 without reducing the basis of partnership
business assets. The basis of partnership assets remains intact for
purposes of depreciation deductions while the basis of non-part-
nership assets would be reduced to avoid income recognition.
Stackhouse grants partner-taxpayers two important tax advan-
tages solely on the basis of the form of business organization: (1)
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, and (2) deferral of
tax consequence without reduction in basis of business assets.
70
Consequently, by failing to develop a theory for analyzing the in-
dependent section 61(a) (12) income recognition and section
752 (b)-section 731(a) gain recognition aspects of partnership dis-
charge of indebtedness transactions and to equalize the treatment
accorded partner-taxpayers and nonpartner-taxpayers,
Stackhouse did little to settle the controversy in this area.
B. Revenue Ruling 71-301-Independent Significance and Insolvency
Exception Problems
Without citing Stackhouse, but in probable response to that
case, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 71-30171 to clarify
problems raised by discharge of indebtedness in the Subchapter K
context. In this Ruling, advice was requested regarding the appli-
cation of sections 752(b) and 731(a) to the partners and the part-
nership in the following circumstances: A partnership and all its
partners were adjudicated bankrupt and discharged from all in-
debtedness under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, with the dis-
charge of indebtedness in bankruptcy rendering neither the
partnership nor any of its partners solvent.
The question presented was whether *the partners must recog-
nize gain under the section 752(b)-section 731(a) gain recognition
scheme. The Service first noted that a section 752(b) deemed dis-
tribution occurred upon discharge of the partnership indebted-
ness, and that gain recognition under section 731(a) would
normally result. However, noting with approval the insolvency ex-
ception principles set forth in Treasury Regulations section 1.61-
70. See Moore & Keller, Discharge of partnership indebtedness: Stackhouse mud-
dies the water, 6 TAX ADVISER 134, 138 (1975).
71. 1971-2 C.B. 257.
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12(b) (1), the Service held that section 731(a), with respect to rec-
ognition of gain, was not applicable to the partners under the facts
presented. Therefore, a partner would not recognize gain, notwith-
standing that the section 752(b) deemed distribution exceeded the
adjusted basis of the partnership interest immediately before the
distribution, since the discharge in bankruptcy did not make the
partner or the partnership solvent.72
Several aspects of this Revenue Ruling must be noted in com-
parison to the positions set forth in Stackhouse. First, the Ruling
appears to give independent significance to the section 61(a) (12)
and sections 752(b) and 731(a) aspects of the discharge of partner-
ship indebtedness, in conflict with Stackhouse. However, this con-
ffict is more apparent than real because the particular facts in the
Ruling do not generate section 61(a) (12) income to the partner-
ship.73 Because neither the partnership nor any partners were
rendered solvent by the discharge, the potential for recognition of
section 61(a) (12) income by the partnership, which arose in
Stackhouse, was not applicable in the Ruling. Second, and most
important, the principles of the section 61(a) (12) insolvency ex-
ception were injected into the section 752(b)-section 731(a) gain
recognition scheme to preempt section 731(a) gain recognition by
the insolvent partners. The Service's unusual extension of the in-
solvency exception into the partnership context to preempt capital
gain recognition by an insolvent partner under section 731(a) is
unsupported by either the statutes or the case law.74 However,
this result is arguably justifiable on the hardship and net worth
principles underlying the insolvency exception. Third, the Ruling
is consistent with the Service's position in Stackhouse that section
61 (a) (12) controls the tax impact of the discharge of indebtedness
transaction although the Service apparently concedes that a sec-
tion 752(b) deemed distribution will inevitably occur when part-
nership debt is discharged.75 Fourth, the Ruling leaves the
Service's approach to the insolvency exception unclear. In
Stackhouse, the Service assumed a pure aggregate theory, ap-
72. Id.
73. See also McKIE, supra note 3, at 9-38.
74. No clear statutory basis for injecting the insolvency exception into the I.R.C.
§ 731(a) gain context to prevent gain recognition by insolvent partner-taxpay-
ers is apparent. This Service position appears clearly fallible under a statu-
tory construction attack. However, this approach was adopted in Arthur P,
Fixel, 33 T.C.M. 857 (1974), in which the taxpayer attempted to inject the in-
solvency exception into the I-R.C. § 741 context to prevent gain recognition by
an insolvent partner on sale of a partnership interest. The issue was not
reached because of a proof problem.
75. This evidences a retreat from the Service's litigating position in Stackhouse
and a recognition of the inevitable basis reduction when liabilities are re-
duced. See note 10 supra.
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proach in which section 61(a) (12) income recognition would be
limited by the partner's post-discharge of indebtedness solvency.7 6
In the Ruling, the Service implies that section 731(a) gain would be
recognized by a partner if either the '"partner or the partnership" 77
were rendered solvent by the discharge. This appears to leave
open the possibility that, under an entity theory approach, an in-
solvent partner could be required to recognize section 731(a) gain
if the partnership were rendered solvent by the discharge of in-
debtedness. Whether this distinction in possible approaches is
based upon whether the section 61(a) (12) or section 731(a) con-
text is involved is unclear and its validity is questionable.7 8
Because of the factual dissimilarity between Revenue Ruling
71-301 and Stackhouse, little clarification of problems involved in
discharge of partnership indebtedness was achieved. It was not
possible for the Service to adopt a position of recognizing the in-
dependent significance of the section 61(a) (12) and section
752(b)-section 731(a) aspects of the discharge of indebtedness
under the facts presented by the Ruling. Nevertheless, the Service
did seize the opportunity to extend the section 61(a) (12) insol-
vency exception principles into the section 731 (a) context to pre-
vent partner-taxpayers from suffering a tax disadvantage not
experienced by nonpartner-taxpayers in similar situations.7 9 To
this extent, then, Revenue Ruling 71-301 eliminated a disadvanta-
geous tax consequence to partner-taxpayers left open by
Stackhouse.
C. Revenue Ruling 72-205--Availability of Sections 108 and 1017
Deferral of Section 61(a)(12) Discharge Income to a Partnership
In further response to problems generated when partnership
indebtedness is discharged, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 72-
205.80 The Ruling involved the following factual circumstances: A
partnership negotiated the discharge of indebtedness incurred in
connection with property used in its trade or business for an
amount less than the face amount of the debt and realized income
to that extent.8 1 The Service concluded that the income realized
by discharge of indebtedness may be excluded from the gross in-
come of the partnership if the partnership makes timely consent
under section 108 to adjustment of basis of partnership assets
76. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
77. Rev. Rul 71-301, 1971-2 C.B. 257.
78. See note 74 supra.
79. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
80. 1972-1 C.B. 37.
81. Id.
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under section 1017. It also held that a section 752(b) deemed distri-
bution occurred in the amount of the total liability (which included
the amount excluded from partnership income under section 108),
thereby reducing the basis of each partnership interest under sec-
tion 733.82
Several aspects of this Ruling are of notable importance in com-
parison to the positions set forth in Revenue Ruling 71-301 and
Stackhouse. First, and most important, the Service took a position
recognizing the independent significance of the section 61(a) (12)
income recognition and sections 752(b) and 731(a) gain recogni-
tion aspects of the discharge transaction, a position apparently
contrary to Revenue Ruling 71-301 and the holding in Stackhouse.
Second, the Ruling adopted an entity theory approach to section
61(a) (12) income recognition by the partnership and deferral of in-
come recognition under sections 108 and 1017. However, the entity
theory approach, rather than an aggregate theory approach, may
be justifiable in situations in which insolvency exception problems
are not present.83 Third, the Service took the position that a sec-
tion 108 election is available to a partnership, a proposition argua-
bly unsupported by the statutory scheme.84 Fourth, the Service
left unanswered the question whether a partner would be required
to recognize section 731(a) gain if the section 752 (b) deemed distri-
bution exceeded the basis of his or her partnership interest imme-
diately before the distribution, where the partnership also realizes
section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income, whether or
not sections 108 and 1017 are applicable. The Ruling left this issue
unsettled because it assumed that only a section 733 basis reduc-
tion resulted from the section 752(b) deemed distribution.85
V. GENERALIZATIONS, UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, AND
POSSIBLE APPROACHES
It should be readily apparent that Stackhouse and Revenue
Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 are less than adequate to define with the
necessary degree of certainty the tax impact of discharge of part-
nership indebtedness transactions. The extent to which
Stackhouse should be relied upon by partner-taxpayers is unclear
because of several logical fallacies in the Stackhouse rationale
which may make its continuing viability questionable. However,
against the logical fallacies of the Stackhouse rationale and the
clear tax advantage afforded partner-taxpayers must be balanced
82. Id.
83. See notes 97-99 & accompanying text infra.
84. See note 104 & accompanying text infra.
85. See Moore & Keller, supra note 70, at 138 n.31.
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the glaring failure of the statutory scheme to integrate discharge of
indebtedness income notions into the partnership income tax pro-
visions of Subchapter K. For partner-taxpayers willing to assume
the inevitable hazards of litigation to gain the tax advantages of
the Stackhouse rationale, a strong statutory construction argu-
ment is available to promote the theory that the discharge of in-
debtedness income provisions were not intended to be integrated
with the partnership income taxation scheme of Subchapter K.
This theory would undercut any Service arguments to the contrary
under Revenue Ruling 71-301 or Revenue Ruling 72-205.
The initial premise is that the general discharge of indebted-
ness provisions were available to the drafters when the specific
partnership income tax provisions of Subchapter K were devel-
oped in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The absence of any
Subchapter K provision dealing with partnership discharge in-
come arguably supports the proposition that the later, specific stat-
utory scheme of Subchapter K was not intended to integrate the
earlier, general discharge of indebtedness provisions. The only at-
tempted integration of the two statutory schemes appears in
Treasury Regulations section 1.752-1(b) (1) which provides, in what
appears to be an after-thought of the drafters: "For the effect of a
discharge of indebtedness on the basis of partnership property,
see sections 108 and 1017."86 Apparently, the drafters of this regu-
lation anticipated some interrelationship between section 752 and
the general discharge of indebtedness provisions.87 However, ex-
amination of the statutory schemes themselves reveals no at-
tempted integration thus leaving the statutory basis for this
regulation, at best, unclear. The basic statutory scheme itself ar-
guably supports the proposition that discharge of indebtedness
provisions are inapplicable in the Subchapter K context, as the
Court effectively held in Stackhouse,88 on the theory that a later
specific statute controls an earlier general statute.
Revenue Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 evidence a marked shift in
the Service's position since Stackhouse, and appear to be an at-
tempt by the Service to eliminate the tax advantages and disad-
vantages accruing solely to partner-taxpayers under the
Stackhouse rationale. However, the statutory basis for this shift in
Service position evidenced in Revenue Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 is
anything but substantial due to the statutory failure to integrate
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1) (1956).
87. See Moore & Keller, supra note 70, at 138.
88. Although this is not the explicit holding in Stackhouse, it is clear that the
result was solely controlled by the Subchapter K provisions, despite intima-
tions by the court to the contrary. See note 90 & accompanying text infra.
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Subchapter K and the general discharge of indebtedness provi-
sions.
Although many problems remain, a certain degree of predict-
ability is available regarding the treatment of partnership dis-
charge of indebtedness transactions in light of the Service's
positions in Revenue Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 and the Stackhouse
rationale. The remainder of this comment will attempt to articu-
late what generalizations may be made, what problems remain un-
solved, and to suggest some possible approaches.
A. The Independent Significance Issue
Although both the Service and partner-taxpayer positions ad-
vanced in Stackhouse failed to afford the distinct section 61(a) (12)
income recognition and section 752(b)-section 731 (a) gain recog-
nition schemes independent significance, the Stackhouse rationale
developed by the court is arguably unsupportable both in logic and
theory. This rationale, whereby the tax impact of partnership debt
discharge transactions is solely controlled by the sections 752(b)
and 731 (a) gain recognition scheme has been subject to criticism
on several grounds.89
First, in Stackhouse the court stated that "[i] n a sense then we
are giving effect to both sections of the Code,"90 referring to sec-
tions 61(a) (12) and 752(b). This assertion is questionable because
the tax impact of the transaction was determined solely under the
gain recognition provisions of sections 752(b) and 731(a). It is true
that the amount of section 731(a) capital gain recognized by the
partners was less than the amount otherwise recognizable by the
partners under a section 61(a) (12) theory and, therefore, the result
reached is not in confict with insolvency exception principles.
However, the crucial issue is whether under the Stackhouse ra-
tionale a different result would have been reached if the principles
of the section 61(a) (12) insolvency exception would have been vio-
lated by the amount of gain otherwise recognizable under section
731(a). This is precisely the issue raised in Revenue Ruling 71-301
from which it is clear that a Stackhouse rationale would have re-
quired a contrary result. Therefore, the statement that the
Stackhouse rationale, whereby the tax impact is solely controlled
by sections 752(b) and 731(a), "[gives] effect to both sections of
the Code"9 1 is of doubtful validity.
Furthermore, the court stated that since a section 752(b) distri-
bution had been found, it "necessarily" followed that the gain rec-
89. See generally McKEE, supra note 3, at 9-37 to -38.
90. 441 F.2d at 470.
91. Id
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ognized by the partner-taxpayers must be determined under
section 731(a).92 This statement is unquestionably true within the
sections 752(b) and 731(a) gain recognition context. But in con-
junction with the statement previously considered, it evidences
the fallacy of failing to independently consider the income recogni-
tion aspects to the partnership of liability affecting transactions.
Clearly, the statutory scheme contemplates that income recogni-
tion to the partnership will operate independently from gain recog-
nition to the partner-taxpayers which arises from the same
partnership transaction. Therefore, when liability affecting trans-
actions occur, two independent tax effects need be considered: (1)
the income recognition at the partnership level to be passed
through to the partner-taxpayers under the section 702 provisions,
and (2) the gain recognition at the partner level under sections
752(b) and 731(a). Transactions involving partnership liabilities
clearly may independently generate both ordinary income and
capital gain recognition by the partner-taxpayers. 93 Therefore, on
the basis of these logical flaws in the Stackhouse rationale, its con-
tinuing viability to confer distinct tax advantages upon partner-
taxpayers is subject to question.
The Service position in Stackhouse, however, also lacks justifi-
cation for the same reasons. The Service's post-Stackhouse posi-
tion appears to have evolved to the point of a general recognition
that partnership debt discharge transactions may indeed contain
both a section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income ele-
ment and a section 752(b)-section 731(a) gain element. Revenue
Ruling 72-205 clearly adopted this position in a situation in which
no insolvency exception issue was presented. However, in Reve-
nue Ruling 71-301, in which the insolvency exception issue was
presented, the facts of the Ruling precluded the Service from
adopting a position in direct conflict with Stackhouse. Whether a
logical basis exists to justify a difference in position depending
upon whether the insolvency exception issue is presented is un-
clear. In addition, Revenue Ruling 71-301 did inject section
61(a) (12) insolvency exception principles into the section 731(a)
context so as to preempt section 731(a) gain recognition by insol-
vent partners, thereby eliminating a disparate tax impact solely
befalling partner-taxpayers under the Stackhouse rationale. How-
ever, this result did not recognize the independent section
61(a) (12) and section 752(b) aspects of the debt discharge transac-
tion.
Given this general development of the independent significance
issue, the following generalizations appear supportable:
92. Id.
93. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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1. In situations not involving an insolvency exception issue,
the Service will give independent effect to the section
61(a) (12) and 752(8) aspects of the discharge transaction
under Revenue Ruling 72-205. Any partner-taxpayer chal-
lenge under Stackhouse based on a statutory construction
theory must overcome the logical fallacies of the
Stackhouse rationale. If Revenue Ruling 72-205 was up-
held, the tax advantages available under the Stackhouse ra-
tionale to partner-taxpayers would be eliminated.
2. In situations involving the insolvency exception, where no
section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income is real-
ized by the partnership, insolvency exception principles
will also prevent section 731(a) gain recognition by insol-
vent partners under Revenue Ruling 71-301. This result
should hardly be subject to challenge by partner-taxpayers
relieved of a tax disadvantage resulting solely to partner-
taxpayers under the Stackhouse rationale.
3. In situations involving the insolvency exception, where sec-
tion 61(a) (12) discharge income would be realized by the
partnership if the independent section 61(a) (12) and sec-
tion 752(b) aspects of the transaction were recognized, the
probable result is unclear. This is a Stackhouse-type situa-
tion in which the Service has failed to clearly establish a
contrary position based on the theory of independent
significance through Revenue Rulings 71-301 and 72-205.
The Stackhouse-type situation is the area in which the issue of
independent significance will likely be raised and ultimately set-
tled.94 Partner-taxpayers, arguing Stackhouse and a statutory con-
struction theory, would be met by the Service's assertion of the
logical fallacies of the Stackhouse rationale and the logic of accord-
ing the section 61(a) (12) income aspect and section 752(b) gain as-
pect of partnership debt discharge transactions independent
significance. Ultimately, the conflict will probably be settled on the
basis of whether partner-taxpayers and nonpartner-taxpayers
should receive similar tax treatment in discharge of indebtedness
situations.
B. The Insolvency Exception Issue
Assuming sections 61(a)(12) and 752(b) are accorded in-
dependent significance, so that a partnership may indeed realize
section 61(a) (12) discharge income when partnership indebted-
94. See Austin v. United States, 461 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1972), in which the
Stackhouse issue was raised but avoided by the court for failure to properly
raise the issue in the pleadings.
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ness is discharged, the fundamental question of how the insol-
vency exception is to be applied in the partnership context must
be resolved. Resolution of this issue involves overcoming the ag-
gregate/entity theoretical conflict in deciding whether to apply the
insolvency exception at the partnership or partner level. At pres-
ent, this issue is totally unresolved by the courts.95
Under the aggregate theory, the amount of section 61(a) (12) in-
come realized by the partnership is limited by the partner's post-
discharge of indebtedness solvency. The solvency of the partner-
ship itself as a result of the discharge is not relevant to the issue of
section 61(a) (12) income recognition, except to the extent it is a
part of the individual partner's post-discharge solvency. This the-
ory of applying the insolvency exception is integrated with the ex-
isting statutory scheme only if section 61(a) (12) partnership
discharge of indebtedness income is passed through separately as
a section 702(a) (7) "other item of income" and the insolvency ex-
ception is applied at the partner level.96 This is basically the ap-
proach utilized by the Service in Stackhouse and Revenue Ruling
71-301.97
Under the entity theory, however, the amount of section
61(a) (12) income realized by the partnership is not limited by the
partner's post-discharge of indebtedness solvency but only by the
post-discharge solvency of the partnership itself. Although under
a pure entity theory analysis, the partner's post-discharge of in-
debtedness solvency would be totally irrelevant to partnership re-
alization of section 61(a) (12) income, it is unclear whether
consideration should be given to the partner's post-discharge sol-
vency in determining the solvency of the partnership itself.98 This
theory of applying the insolvency exception is integrated with the
existing statutory scheme only if section 61(a) (12) partnership dis-
charge of indebtedness income is passed through as a section
702(a) (8) item of "taxable income" after the insolvency exception
has been applied at the partnership level.99
It should be noted that neither of the above theories is beyond
95. The district court in Stackhouse took the partner's post-discharge solvency
into account in limiting recognition of partnership discharge income. See
Stackhouse v. United States, 27 A.F.T.R2d 71-414 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd and
remanded, 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1971).
96. See McKEE, supra note 3, at 9-38.
97. This is a pure aggregate approach. See note 53 supra.
98. The problem with this pure entity theory is that it ignores the fact that gen-
eral partners are personally liable for partnership obligations. To this extent,
the assets of general partners are contingent partnership assets and are rele-
vant to determine the post-discharge of indebtedness solvency of the partner-
ship. See MCKEE, supra note 3, at 9-39 n.140.
99. See id. at 9-39.
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challenge under the present statutory scheme and any other co-
herent alternative theories available should be considered as well.
As discussed previously, a major impact of the choice between
applying an aggregate theory or entity theory approach to the in-
solvency exception may lie in a possible significant difference in
the partner's post-discharge of indebtedness basis in his or her
partnership interest.100 Under the aggregate theory, partnership
discharge of indebtedness income is passed through as a section
702(a) (7) item with the insolvency exception applied at the part-
ner level. Therefore, partners are assured a full basis increase for
their partnership interests under section 705 regardless of the fact
that a portion of the discharge of indebtedness income is not recog-
nized by application of the insolvency exception. Under the entity
theory, however, the assurance of a full basis increase for a part-
nership interest is less clear because the partnership discharge of
indebtedness income is treated as a section 702(a) (8) item, with
the insolvency exception applied at the partnership level, thereby
excluding a portion of the discharge of indebtedness income from
the section 702(a) (8) pass through and resultant section 705 basis
increase. In order to achieve a full basis increase under section 705,
the amount excluded by the insolvency exception at the partner-
ship level must be classed as tax-exempt income under section
705(a) (1) (B), an approach not without its technical statutory diffi-
culties.' 0 l
If the goal in partnership taxation is to preserve the equality
between the basis of partnership assets ("inside" basis) and the
aggregate bases of the partners in their partnership interests
("outside" basis) the statutory language must be interpreted to al-
low for a full basis increase for partnership interests under section
705, regardless of the theory adopted in insolvency exception situa-
tions. Furthermore, this would bring about parity with non-insol-
vency exception situations in which no basis distinction is
generated.
Whatever approach to application of the insolvency exception
in the partnership context is finally determined by the courts, the
aggregate theory approach adopted by the Service should be seri-
ously considered. The aggregate theory approach appears
favorable for two reasons. First, under a state law conception of a
partnership and its composite partners, an insular perspective on
the liability issue is unavailable. 0 2 Second, under the federal tax
law conception of a partnership, the ultimate tax impact of part-
100. See notes 56-58 & accompanying text supra.
101. See note 58 supra.
102. For liability purposes, general partners and the partnership are inseparable
due to the fact that general partners are jointly and severally liable for all
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nership discharge of indebtedness transactions upon a partnership
cannot be separated from the impact on the composite partners 0 3
Therefore, an aggregate theory approach seems to more clearly
consider the interrelationship of a partnership and its partners in
insolvency exception situations.
Finally, it must be remembered that the insolvency exception
issue is only relevant insofar as the underlying assumption that a
partnership may realize section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebted-
ness income holds true, a proposition not entirely free from doubt
in light of the existing statutory scheme and the Stackhouse hold-
ing. The utilization of the insolvency exception in Revenue Ruling
71-301 must be distinguished as applicable only in the section
731(a) context and not in the context of the general partnership
income mechanism of section 702. Therefore, if a partnership may
indeed realize section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income,
a coherent theory for applying the insolvency exception is yet to be
developed.
C. The Section 108-Section 1017 Deferral Issue
Two factual predicates must exist before the application of the
section 108-section 1017 deferral mechanism will arise in the part-
nership context. First, the section 61(a) (12) and section 752(b) as-
pects of the partnership debt discharge transaction must be
accorded independent significance so that the partnership may re-
alize section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income. Second,
the amount of section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income
realized in the transaction must exceed the amount of such income
excluded from recognition by application of the insolvency excep-
tion.
If these two factual predicates exist, the Service apparently
concedes in Revenue Ruling 72-205 that the section 108--section
1017 deferral mechanism is available to a partnership. Two aspects
of this concession need be examined. First, making a section 108
election available to a partnership is arguably contrary to the clear
requirement in section 108 that an "individual" make the election.
To the extent a partnership is not an "individual" for purposes of
section 108, the concession in Revenue Ruling 72-205 would lack
statutory support. 0 4 Second, by holding that the partnership real-
ized section 61(a) (12) discharge of indebtedness income, in argua-
ble conflict with Stackhouse, the Service was forced to make the
partnership debts. See Uniform Partnership Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-315
(Reissue 1976).
103. See IR.C. § 701.
104. No statutory support under I.R.C. § 108 exists for making the election avail-
able to a partnership.
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section 108 election available to the partnership to avoid partner-
taxpayers being treated differently than nonpartner-taxpayers in
debt discharge situations. This would effectively avoid similar crit-
icisms that were directed at the Stackhouse rationale and soften
the impact of holding that a partnership realizes section 61(a) (12)
income. In spite of the Service's concession in Revenue Ruling 72-
205, the issue of the threshold applicability of section 108 to a part-
nership could clearly be challenged on a statutory construction
theory by partner-taxpayers relying on Stackhouse.
Assuming the section 108-section 1017 deferral privilege is
available to a partnership, a further unsettled issue must be re-
solved relating to the manner of applying the deferral mechanism
in light of the aggregate/entity theoretical tension. With no insol-
vency exception issue presented by the facts of Revenue Ruling 72-
205, the Service adopted an entity theory approach by holding that
the partnership makes the section 108 election to adjust the bases
of partnership assets. This appears to be somewhat contrary to
the aggregate theory approach generally adopted by the Service in
Stackhouse and Revenue Ruling 71-301.
Under an aggregate theory approach, the section 108 election
should be available to the individual partners to adjust the bases of
the partner's assets under section 1017.
The entity theory approach of Revenue Ruling 72-205 is argua-
bly justified because no insolvency exception situation was
presented. Although .contrary to the Service's position in
Stackhouse and Revenue Ruling 71-301, in which the insolvency
exception situation was presented, the entity theory approach rec-
ognizes that a viable partnership entity with tangible assets exists
for purposes of making the section 108 election and section 1017
basis adjustment. However, in insolvency exception situations, in
which no viable partnership entity with tangible assets exists, the
aggregate theory approach should vitiate against application of
Revenue Ruling 72-205 so as to prevent loss of the deferral privi-
lege simply because no assets are available at the partnership
level.105 Whether an entity theory or aggregate theory approach is
finally adopted, in the interests of consistency both the application
of the insolvency exception and the section 108-section 1017
deferral mechanism should be approached on the same theoretical
basis.
105. Under an aggregate theory approach, a priority rule could be developed
which would first require basis reductions to the extent assets remained at
the partnership level and then allow partners to adjust the basis of individual
assets.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It should be apparent that the issues generated in exploring the
interrelationship of the general rules regarding discharge of in-
debtedness income of Subchapter B and the partnership income
tax provisions of Subchapter K are difficult and far from settled.
Due to a failure by the drafters to clearly indicate the extent to
which the statutory schemes were intended to be integrated, the
positions established by the Stackhouse decision and Revenue
Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 cannot be supported by a clear showing
of statutory authority.
For partner-taxpayers willing to seek the distinct tax ad-
vantages flowing from the Stackhouse rationale, a strong statutory
construction theory is available to counter a contrary Service posi-
tion based upon Revenue Rulings 71-301 and 72-205 and the logical
deficiencies of the Stackhouse decision. Given the proper stakes to
provide an incentive for tax gamesmanship, the controversy in-
volving the interrelationship of the general rules regarding dis-
charge of indebtedness income and the partnership income tax
provisions of Subchapter K will likely arise again.
Blair L. Lockwood '78
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